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ELECTION LAW ORIGINALISM: THE SUPREME COURT'S 
ELITIST CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY  
YASMIN DAWOOD* 
INTRODUCTION 
Election law faces significant, even unprecedented, challenges in our 
modern social media world. As Richard Hasen argues, these challenges include 
rapid technological innovation, false and misleading speech, foreign 
disinformation campaigns, the decline of accepted neutral arbiters of fact and 
truth, voter mistrust, information silos, and an increasingly hyper-partisan 
political climate.1 Professor Hasen develops carefully crafted legal tools to 
respond to such challenges, including labeling and disclosure laws, but he is 
attentive to the fundamental dilemma that the cure can often be worse than the 
disease, and that regulations intended to address these serious problems may 
pose threats to democratic functioning itself. 
Yet even the standard topics of election law—such as campaign finance, 
electoral redistricting, and voter qualification laws—are likewise facing a deeply 
uncertain future in large part due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions. 
This Essay addresses some of these issues at a macro level by focusing on the 
larger, conceptual questions at stake. In particular, it considers two inter-related 
questions. First: How should we conceptualize the role of the Supreme Court as 
an institution in these decisions? Second: What is the underlying conception of 
democracy that best elucidates the Court’s major election law decisions in the 
last decade or so? While it is entirely possible that no such underlying 
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 1. See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in 
a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (2020) (Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture). 
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conception is held by the justices,2 we can consider the question objectively by 
evaluating the cases from an external perspective.3 
To address these questions, this Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions to determine if there is a 
consistent approach to the judicial function in supervising the electoral process. 
In recent years, the Court majority has become increasingly hostile to the 
regulation of campaign finance and has acted strenuously against measures 
meant to level the playing field.4 This active intervention stands in notable 
contrast to its point blank refusal to intervene in partisan gerrymandering.5 At 
the same time, the Court majority intervened to effectively end the preclearance 
protections under the Voting Rights Act despite the support these provisions had 
long enjoyed from Congress.6 Is the Court, or at least the conservative majority, 
exiting the political thicket? Or is it deregulating the electoral process? Part I 
argues that the Supreme Court’s role cannot be easily reduced to a single or 
consistent approach. It is a complex picture. The Court’s intervention appears to 
be tactical and results-driven rather than being oriented by a particular theory of 
the judicial function in supervising the law of democracy.  
Part II argues that instead of a consistent theory of the judicial function, the 
Court majority’s recent election law opinions, when viewed from an external 
perspective, display a particular vision of democracy that is fundamentally elitist 
in its outlook. This elitist vision of democracy presents a significant challenge 
to the egalitarian conception of democracy that was evident in the Supreme 
Court’s election law decisions in the decades following the civil rights era. The 
elitist approach also stands in marked contrast to the egalitarian approach to 
democracy that is evident in the dissenting opinions of the four liberal justices. 
It claims further that this elitist conception of democracy is a familiar one—it 
has certain continuities (and discontinuities) with theories of republicanism that 
existed at the time of the Founding. To illustrate these continuities, this Part 
excavates founding era themes from the Court’s recent election law decisions.  
Given the echo of founding era themes, Part III considers the role of 
originalism in current election law decisions. It concludes that neither the 
Court’s decisions, nor the emerging elitist conception of democracy, fall within 
 
 2. We might also think that there ought not to be a grand theory of democracy that is guiding 
the Court. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—And Be 
Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245 
(David K. Ryden, ed., 2000). 
 3. In past work, I have addressed the Supreme Court’s conceptions of democracy. See e.g. 
Yasmin Dawood, Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court: Campaign Finance Reform in 
Comparative Context, 4 INTL. J. OF CONST. L. 269, 271 (2006) (arguing that judicial decisions on 
the electoral process are at base disputes among competing visions of democracy). 
 4. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019). 
 6. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
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originalism strictly understood. That being said, this Part suggests that some of 
the Court majority’s arguments display an originalist orientation in which 
original meaning takes a preponderant weight in the analysis even if it does not 
compel the overall outcome. 
In practical terms, this originalist orientation has significant implications for 
future election law cases because it means that, at least for some issues, the 
founding era is serving as an implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the 
Court. Part III identifies three ways in which the Court majority’s originalist 
orientation matters: first, non-originalist precedents would likely carry less 
precedential weight; second, election law federalism would likely be interpreted 
in a manner hostile to egalitarian ideals; and third, electoral reform efforts could 
be thwarted. In future cases, the Supreme Court majority’s originalist orientation 
will likely further erode the egalitarian approach to democracy, thereby 
rendering democratic self-government less inclusive, less equal, and less 
responsive to the people. 
I.  THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
The question of what, if anything, courts ought to do in the supervision of 
democracy has long been the subject of considerable scholarly debate.7 In the 
last decade, however, the Supreme Court has implicitly abandoned many of the 
theories used to describe its decisions of the preceding decades. John Hart Ely’s 
influential participation-reinforcing justification of judicial review,8 while 
reflected in the malapportionment cases,9 was completely absent in the Court’s 
recent partisan gerrymandering decision.10 Theories of racial equality were 
evident in the racial vote dilution cases,11 but were considerably muted in a 
recent case that eliminated a key provision of the Voting Rights Act.12 
Arguments about preventing the distorting effects of vast wealth on the electoral 
process were relied upon in prior campaign finance cases,13 but were roundly 
rejected in recent cases.14 The conspicuous absence of these longstanding 
 
 7. For a summary, see Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial 
Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1420–27 (2008). 
 8. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 
(1981). 
 9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964). 
 10. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). For an elaboration of this 
argument, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, SUP. CT. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
 11. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982). 
 12. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013). 
 13. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber 
of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 653 (1990); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003). 
 14. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 
229 (2014). 
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theories and justifications marks an extraordinary turn in the Supreme Court’s 
election law jurisprudence.  
The question of the Supreme Court’s role was central to the Court’s most 
recent election law decision, Rucho v. Common Cause,15 in which a five to four 
majority of the Court held that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable 
political question.16 At issue in Rucho, and its companion case Lamone v. 
Benisek, were the North Carolina and Maryland congressional districting maps, 
which had been struck down by lower courts as unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymanders.17 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the 
districting plans were “highly partisan, by any measure”18 and that the record 
contained evidence that the maps were drawn deliberately to entrench partisan 
advantage.19 For the majority, the central issue was whether the problem of 
partisan gerrymandering amounted to “claims of legal right, resolvable 
according to legal principles, or political questions that must find their resolution 
elsewhere.”20 The Court concluded that “partisan gerrymandering claims 
present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts”21 and 
moreover, that federal judges “have no license to reallocate political power 
between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in 
the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.”22  
The Court majority’s first set of arguments concerned the Elections Clause, 
and here the majority essentially reproduced Justice Frankfurter’s analysis in 
Colegrove v Green.23 In Colegrove, a four to three plurality of the Court held 
that the malapportionment of state legislatures was not justiciable.24 Drawing on 
an analysis of the Elections Clause in Article I Section 4 of the Constitution, 
Justice Frankfurter argued that “the Constitution has conferred upon Congress 
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States,”25 leaving no role 
for the judiciary. The majority opinion in Rucho provided a similar analysis of 
the Elections Clause and concluded on a similar note: under the terms of the 
Constitution, and as endorsed by the Framers, the solution for partisan 
gerrymandering lay with Congress and not with the federal judiciary.26  
 
 15. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2490–91. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts joined by 
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. 
 16. Id. at 2506–07. 
 17. The North Carolina map, which was at issue in Rucho, disfavored Democrats, while the 
Maryland map, which was at issue in Lamone, disfavored Republicans. Id. at 2487. 
 18. Id. at 2491. 
 19. Id. at 2492. 
 20. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 21. Id. at 2506–07. 
 22. Id. at 2507. 
 23. Colegrove v Green, 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946). 
 24. Id. at 556. 
 25. Id. at 554. 
 26. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494-96. 
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The Court majority then provided reasons as to why there are no standards 
to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering. One reason is that partisan 
gerrymandering involves fundamental questions about fair representation and 
the allocation of political power—a matter that falls outside of the Court’s 
authority and expertise.27 The majority’s analysis was reminiscent of Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr,28 in which he argued that:  
Talk of “debasement” or “dilution” is circular talk. One cannot speak of 
“debasement” or “dilution” of the value of a vote until there is first defined a 
standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth. What is actually asked 
of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation—
ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy—in order 
to establish an appropriate frame of government . . . for all the States of the 
Union.29 
In a similar vein, the Court majority argued that it is impossible to know what 
fairness looks like, illustrating the difficulty with various alternate scenarios of 
how political fairness could be measured.30 Not only are these different visions 
of fairness political rather than legal in nature, argued the majority, they also do 
not shed light on the dividing line between permissible and unconstitutional 
partisanship.31 In addition, the majority posited that partisan gerrymandering 
claims are ultimately rooted in a desire for proportional representation, a concept 
that is alien to the Constitution and the Framers’ vision.32  
In the remainder of the opinion, the Court majority considered and 
ultimately rejected all the proposed standards for adjudicating partisan 
gerrymandering. The majority dismissed the standards from the 
malapportionment and racial gerrymandering cases.33 It rejected the standard of 
non-partisanship because this approach “would essentially countermand the 
Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.”34 Instead, the 
standard must identify when partisan gerrymandering is excessive—an objective 
which has eluded the Court in all its prior partisan gerrymandering cases.35 The 
Court majority also rejected all the other proposed approaches, including the 
 
 27. Id. at 2499–2500. 
 28. Baker, 369 U.S. at 300; for a similar argument, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 10. 
 29. Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 30. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500. 
 31. Id. at 2501. 
 32. Id. at 2499. 
 33. Id. at 2501–02. 
 34. Id. at 2497. 
 35. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 367 (2004), and LULAC v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)). 
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plaintiffs’ tests,36 associational rights arguments,37 and the argument that state 
officials did not have the authority under the Elections Clause to disfavor the 
supporters of a particular candidate when drawing district lines.38 
As Justice Kagan’s powerful dissent makes clear, and as various 
commentators have observed, the Court majority’s decision is vulnerable to 
criticism on a number of fronts.39 The majority’s claim that there are no 
judicially manageable standards is belied by the fact that the lower courts have 
applied standards to identify extreme gerrymanders. As Justice Kagan pointed 
out, the three part test consisting of (1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation 
around which the lower courts had coalesced was not an unfamiliar one and has 
been used to determine similar types of claims.40 These standards, noted the 
dissent, do not depend on judges’ views on electoral fairness nor do they involve 
courts too deeply in the political process as they are designed to correct only the 
most egregious partisan gerrymanders.41 And while it is true that a line has to be 
drawn somewhere to identify the threshold at which a partisan gerrymander is 
too extreme, courts are routinely called upon to engage in this kind of line-
drawing.42  
By refusing to step in to address extreme partisan gerrymandering in Rucho, 
we might conclude that the Court has retreated from the political thicket in 
keeping with Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v Green. The same logic 
could be applied more generally: on this view, we would expect the Roberts 
Court to adopt a general posture of judicial restraint and non-intervention in 
election law cases. But then we immediately run into a problem. How do we 
explain Shelby County v. Holder?43 In Shelby County, the Court majority did 
 
 36. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502. 
 37. Id. at 2504–05. 
 38. Id. at 2506. 
 39. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 10; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, 
Dirty Thinking About Law and Democracy in Rucho v. Common Cause, 3 AM. CONST. SOC. SUP. 
CT. REV. 293, 295 (2019) https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ACS-Supreme-
Court-Review-2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE2P-J22Y] [hereinafter, “Dirty Thinking”] 
(arguing that the Rucho majority engages in a “narrative of non-intervention”); Guy-Uriel E. 
Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
236, 239–40 (2018) (describing the narrative of non-intervention). 
 40. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Neutrality is assured because the baseline is the state’s 
own characteristics rather than some abstract notion of an “ideally fair” map. The state’s actual 
map is compared to a series of maps that could have been drawn if politicians had not been trying 
to maximize partisan gain. Id. at 2520 (Kagan, J., dissenting). For the Court majority, however, 
taking into account the state’s individual characteristics meant that there is no uniform standard in 
operation since the criteria will shift from state to state. Id. at 2505. But as Justice Kagan observed, 
this is “a virtue, not a vice—a feature, not a bug” because it prevents judges’ own preferences from 
affecting the analysis. Id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 2522 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 43. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013). 
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intervene to strike down a longstanding provision of the Voting Rights Act—a 
statute that has had overwhelming bipartisan congressional support for 
decades.44 The Court majority invalidated a provision containing the “coverage 
formula” which identified those jurisdictions that had to seek prior federal 
approval, known as preclearance, for all changes to voting procedures.45 The 
decision effectively gutted the preclearance process which had for years blocked 
discriminatory voting practices. A similar pattern emerges in the campaign 
finance context. In Citizens United v. FEC46 the Court majority struck down 
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which restricted independent 
expenditures for political communications by corporations. Likewise, the Court 
majority held in McCutcheon v. FEC47 that aggregate contributions limits in the 
Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitutional.  
It would appear at first glance that in Shelby County, Citizens United, and 
McCutcheon, the Court actively intervened in the democratic process to strike 
down statutory provisions that had received widespread congressional support. 
The Court did not exercise judicial restraint nor did it exit the political thicket. 
However, the net effect of the Shelby County decision was to effectively 
eliminate the preclearance process and therefore remove certain types of election 
issues from judicial or executive oversight. As for the campaign finance 
decisions, the net effect was to circumscribe the ability of legislatures to make 
rules in the first instance. This stands in contrast to the aftermath of Shelby 
County, which removed federal executive and judicial oversight over state 
legislatures, thereby freeing them to enact laws untrammeled by the preclearance 
process. 
The judicial function in these cases could be described as a kind of 
deregulation. But we ought to be careful in how we use that term. In some 
instances, it means that there will be classic deregulation in the sense of fewer 
rules. In other instances, however, what we have is not an absence of rules or 
rule-making so much as an absence of guidelines or oversight cabining 
legislative discretion to regulate. The Court majority has intervened to shield 
from oversight certain kinds of legislative rule-making with respect to certain 
voting rules (Shelby County), while in other areas, it has prevented legislatures 
from regulating certain aspects of the electoral process (Citizens United). In 
other cases, it has refused to intervene in the electoral process thereby providing 
legislatures with a green light to pass electoral laws (Rucho). The net result 
consists of a patchwork: for some issues, such as voter qualification rules and 
 
 44. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RIGHTS J. 713, 713–14, 726–27 (describing the majority decision as an “audacious” opinion 
which displays false minimalism). 
 45. Shelby Cty,. 570 U.S. at 550–51. 
 46. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010). 
 47. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 185 (2014). 
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partisan gerrymandering, there is extensive and often unchecked legislative 
activity, while with respect to other areas, such as campaign finance, legislatures 
have increasingly less discretion to regulate. 
According to Nicholas Stephanopoulos, the common thread underlying 
these cases is that the Supreme Court is now an anti-Carolene court in that it 
fails to remedy obvious malfunctions in the political process while 
simultaneously blocking other institutions from doing so.48 I agree that Rucho 
and the Court’s other decisions do not follow Ely’s theory of judicial review, 
and, as I elaborate in Part II below, a possible reason for this is that the Court 
majority’s decisions, whether intended or not, are increasingly espousing an 
elitist conception of democracy. Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer 
argue that in Rucho the conservative justices have subscribed to a traditional 
understanding of politics in which dirty, partisan politics are viewed as being a 
normal part of the political process.49 On this view, the Court is ill-equipped to 
clean up what is an inherently sordid and unfair process. While the argument I 
set out in Part II below differs in the details, I agree that what is at stake in the 
cases is a particular understanding of representative government.  
Another possibility is that the differences among the cases are the product 
of the underlying constitutional provisions: the First Amendment versus the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—and I think this is right 
to some degree. But it is also the case that the First Amendment means what it 
does today because of how the Court majority has chosen to interpret it in recent 
years—and the same is true of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Given the 
empirical research on judicial decision-making,51 it is also possible that the 
justices’ voting patterns in these cases boil down to simple partisan politics, a 
position that is persuasively defended by Professor Stephanopoulos.52 On this 
view, the justices will likely opt for those outcomes that favor the political party 
that matches their partisan preferences. A related possibility is that the justices 
have opted for those outcomes that are favored by like-minded elites who belong 
to the same social, political, and professional networks.53 
 
 48. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10. 
 49. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Dirty Thinking, supra note 39, at 298. 
 50. Daniel P. Tokaji, Denying Systemic Equality: The Last Words of the Kennedy Court, 13 
HARV. L. & POL. REV. 539, 539 (2019). See generally ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 51. There is an extensive scholarly literature on judicial decision-making, which either builds 
upon or reacts to the attitudinal model. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 52. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 21 (arguing that the Court’s decisions can be understood 
on partisan grounds). 
 53. LAWRENCE BAUM & NEAL DEVINS, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN 
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 15 (2019). 
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The main point, though, is that it is a complex picture when it comes to the 
Supreme Court’s role in the law of democracy. With respect to the Court’s 
conservative majority, it is not straightforwardly an exit from the political thicket 
nor a straightforward commitment to deregulation. Nor is the Court majority 
simply a passive actor even when apparently exercising judicial restraint. Its 
decision to not intervene in partisan gerrymandering, for example, is an active 
choice to the extent that it cements in place the status quo.54 Instead, the Court 
majority appears to have adopted a results-oriented approach that relies on a 
suite of tactical moves. 
II.  ELITIST VS. EGALITARIAN CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
Rather than setting forth a consistent theory of the judicial function in a 
democracy, the Supreme Court’s election law decisions are better understood as 
instantiating a particular vision of democracy. Whether intended or not, the 
decisions by the Roberts Court result in a vision of democracy that is decidedly 
elitist in nature. This claim is not meant to establish a causal explanation of these 
cases; instead, it is an assessment of what the cases amount to when considered 
objectively as a whole. To be sure, the elitist approach may be the accidental 
result of a combination of the following factors: the Court’s absolutist approach 
to the First Amendment, its restrictive approach to the equal protection clause, 
and its pro-states interpretation of federalism.55 That being said, the emerging 
elitist conception of democracy displayed in recent election law decisions is 
troubling because it represents a direct challenge to the egalitarian conception of 
democracy that was largely supported by the Supreme Court in the decades 
following the civil rights era. 
Under an elitist conception of democracy, power is held in the hands of a 
privileged few, and political structures and state policies are oriented to a large 
degree, though not necessarily exclusively, to benefit their interests. Elitist 
democracy can be contrasted with an egalitarian conception of democracy under 
which the structures of governance and state policies tend to follow the principle 
of political equality. In an egalitarian democracy, power is held by the people 
and is deployed to benefit their interests on a more or less equal basis. One 
advantage to using the term “elitist,” rather than “undemocratic,” is that the 
concept of elitism better captures a crucial feature of elitist democracy, which is 
the co-existence of anti-egalitarian impulses with otherwise democratic 
processes. Without doubt, an elitist democracy is clearly “undemocratic” by 
contemporary egalitarian understandings of democracy.  
One possible objection to the argument that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions instantiate an elitist approach to democracy is that when the Court 
 
 54. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 68–92 (1993) (defining and elaborating 
the concept of status quo neutrality). 
 55. My thanks to Chad Flanders for very helpful comments on the ideas in this paragraph. 
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intervenes (or fails to intervene) it is not benefitting all elites but rather 
conservative Republican ones.56 Under an elitist approach, government laws and 
policies favor the few. As such, the elitist approach will disfavor Democratic/left 
elites in various dimensions and particularly when Democratic elites are trying 
to implement egalitarian policies and rules. For this reason, the elitist approach 
is often in line with the policy preferences of Republican elites but not 
Democratic elites. More generally, the elitist/egalitarian divide at times maps on 
to the partisan Republican/Democratic divide. 
This elitist conception of democracy, I further suggest, has certain 
continuities and discontinuities with historic approaches to democracy, in 
particular with republican theories of representation and governance at the time 
of the Founding.57 This Part argues that the Constitution established an elitist 
democracy, and that the Framers, in particular James Madison, favored an elitist 
conception of democracy. It then discusses conceptual resemblances between 
the Court’s election law cases and elitist themes from the time of the framing 
with respect to three issues: the role of the wealthy, the role of the people, and 
the management of elections. It claims that the cases taken together amount to 
an elitist approach to democracy, one which echoes certain framing-era ideas 
about who should rule and why.  
A. The Framers’ Elitist Conception of Democracy 
An examination of James Madison’s writings supports the view that the 
Constitution was designed to establish an elitist democracy.58 For Madison, one 
of the greatest threats to the survival of republican government was the 
instability caused by warring factions organized around the unequal distribution 
of wealth.59 Given this existential threat, a fundamental objective of the 
constitutional framework was to protect the property interests of a wealthy 
minority from the claims of a propertyless majority, while at the same time 
protecting the rights of persons in a manner consistent with republican 
principles.60 The dilemma, though, was that the interests of the wealthy were in 
 
 56. My thanks to Nick Stephanopoulos for a very helpful discussion on the relationship 
between partisan polarization and the elitist approach to democracy. 
 57. There is considerable debate about whether the Framers established a democracy or a 
republic. For the purposes of this Essay, I will use the term “democracy” to describe the 
representative system of self-government established by the Constitution. 
 58. This discussion is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional 
Democracy and the Problem of Wealth, 67 MARYLAND L. REV. 123, 126–31 (2007). 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 60. See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES 
MADISON 395 (Marvin Meyers ed., Univ. Press of New England 1981) [hereinafter Property and 
Suffrage]; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1990). 
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jeopardy in a system of universal suffrage, while the interests of the poor were 
at risk in a system of restricted suffrage.61 As Madison put it: 
Allow the right [to vote] exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may 
be oppressed. The feudal polity alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to 
all, and the rights of property or the claims of justice may be overruled by a 
majority without property, or interested in measures of injustice.62 
The risk presented by universal suffrage was that power would eventually be 
held by the unpropertied majority.63 Madison believed that once power was held 
by a propertyless majority, republican government would not long survive. It, 
and the liberty that it fostered, would soon be replaced by either a despotic or an 
oligarchic regime.64 
For Madison, the solution to this dilemma consisted of two key features: 
universal suffrage and large electoral districts.65 In Federalist No. 57, Madison 
emphasized the importance of universal suffrage, stating that both voters and 
candidates are to “be the great body of the people of the United States,” 
excluding neither the poor, nor the ignorant, nor those of humble birth.66 
Universal suffrage was necessary to ensure that the rights of the majority were 
protected.67 Madison’s understanding of “universal” suffrage was extremely 
narrow; while he did include all white males whether propertied or not, he 
excluded slaves, racial minorities, Indigenous peoples, and women. 
Universal suffrage, however, had to be tempered by the extended sphere. As 
Madison posited in Federalist No. 10, in an extended sphere, the “greater variety 
of parties and interests” would reduce the likelihood that a majority “will have 
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”68 An extended sphere 
would also make it more difficult for the citizens to discover and act upon those 
interests that they did share.69 Not only did the extended sphere mechanism 
prevent the formation of possibly dangerous coalitions within society, it also 
ensured the election of a certain kind of representative.70 An extended sphere, 
Madison explained, implied large electoral districts. To get elected from a large 
district, a candidate would need the support of a large number of citizens in a 
dispersed area, thereby lessening the chance that he could win the election by 
 
 61. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 395. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draught of a Constitution for Virginia, 11 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., Univ. Press of Virginia 
1977) [hereinafter, “Observations”]. 
 65. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 399–400. 
 66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 67. Property and Suffrage, supra note 60, at 394, 400. 
 68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 50–51. 
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resorting to the use of fraud and corruption. The result, argued Madison, is that 
voters “will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive 
merit and the most diffusive and established characters.”71 Madison’s 
expectation that the design of political structures would lead to the election of 
established and prominent men is referred to by Bernard Manin as the “principle 
of distinction.”72 As Manin noted, Madison hoped that representation would 
elevate this “natural aristocracy” of talent and virtue to public office.73 The 
extended sphere, and resulting large electoral districts, would lead to the election 
of wealthy, prominent, and civic minded men.74 
Madison’s solution was viewed by the Anti-Federalists as precisely the 
problem: the proposed Constitution would establish an aristocratic tyranny in 
which a powerful few would rule the people.75 Modern commentators have 
likewise argued that the Constitution concentrated power in the hand of the elite. 
Charles Beard contended, for instance, that the Constitution was designed to 
protect the interests of the privileged classes.76 According to Robert Dahl, 
Madison designed a political system that would guarantee the liberties of a 
wealthy and powerful minority by constitutionally trammeling the majority.77 
Jennifer Nedelsky noted that since the Madisonian model identified the people 
as the problem, it was hardly surprising that it did not foster popular 
participation.78 Gordon Wood readily characterized the Framers’ republicanism 
as “an elitist theory of democracy.”79Along the same lines, Emery Lee argued 
that Madison favored an “elitist theory of self-government, one that greatly 
reduces the role of the people themselves in their own government.”80 For many 
scholars, the Framers established an elitist democracy that deprived the people 
of equal participation.81 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 94 (1997). 
 73. Id. at 112–13, 116–17. 
 74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50–51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). To be 
sure, Madison was a realist: although he hoped that virtuous civic-minded men would be elected, 
the entire governmental structure was designed so that ambition would be made to counteract 
ambition, thereby harnessing the anticipated self-interest of elected officials in the service of the 
public good. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 75. HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 43–44, 48–52, 57–58 
(1981). 
 76. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 152–77 (1913). 
 77. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31 (1956). 
 78. NEDELSKY, supra note 60, at 5. 
 79. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 517 (1969). 
 80. Emery G. Lee III, Representation, Virtue, and Political Jealousy in the Brutus-Publius 
Dialogue, 59 J. POL. 1073, 1081 (1997). 
 81. For a discussion of the democratic deficiencies of the Constitution, see ROBERT A. DAHL, 
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?, 15–17, 154–57 (2002); SANFORD 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006). 
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B. Elitist Democracy at the Supreme Court 
In the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions, there are various 
continuities with the Framers’ vision of democracy. The comparisons are by no 
means exact; indeed, as noted below, there are important discontinuities as well. 
Yet there are conceptual resemblances between the Court’s decisions and the 
Framers’ approach to democracy that are noteworthy, particularly in light of the 
Court majority’s evident departure in recent cases from egalitarian theories of 
the judicial supervision of the political process.82 Taking a broad view, the 
Constitution established an elitist democracy in which power was intended to be 
held for the most part by a privileged few who were to have an outsized influence 
on the course of governance. The role of the people was anticipated to be 
episodic but their participation, while contained, was nonetheless crucial as a 
preventative defense against the abuse of power. Similar themes, whether 
intended or not, are evident in the Supreme Court’s recent election law decisions. 
1. The Role of the Wealthy 
The first continuity concerns the role of the wealthy. In Madison’s 
constitutional vision, the task of governance was to be in the hands of the 
wealthy and established members of society. 
There is no question that members of Congress are generally well-to-do as 
compared to the average citizen. In addition, empirical research shows that the 
positions adopted by elected representatives are more responsive to the 
preferences of the affluent as compared to the preferences of the vast majority 
of citizens.83 In keeping with an elitist approach to democracy, the Court’s 
campaign finance decisions have also enhanced the influence of wealthy 
individuals and corporations. In Citizens United v. FEC, for instance, the Court 
majority struck down provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which 
restricted independent expenditures for political communications by 
corporations.84 In a significant move, the Court majority narrowed the definition 
of corruption, holding that the only governmental interest strong enough to 
overcome First Amendment concerns was preventing quid pro quo corruption 
 
 82. To be sure, this claim is limited to the Court’s election law decisions. In other areas of law, 
the conservative justices may champion the people. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF 
CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 75 (2018) (observing that 
Justice Scalia embraced an anti-elitist populism). 
 83. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 116 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 77–78 (2012); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning 
Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1427, 1433, 1468–72 (2015). 
 84. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
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or the appearance thereof.85 The Court’s position was in tension with prior 
decisions which had justified campaign finance regulations on a broader 
understanding of corruption that included access and influence.86 The Court 
majority also rejected the antidistortion rationale by overturning the holding in 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce87 that the government has an interest 
in preventing the distortion created by immense wealth on the electoral system.88 
The net effect of these two developments was to significantly reduce the scope 
of campaign finance regulations, and, by extension, to amplify the relative 
influence of wealthy interests.  
That being said, there is a crucial discontinuity between the Court’s recent 
campaign finance decisions and the constitutional vision of the Framers. 
Madison believed that representatives elected by large electorates would be 
highly independent and less susceptible to undue influence and corruption.89 The 
Court majority, however, does not share the Framers’ concerns about the 
independence of elected representatives. In McCutcheon v. FEC, for instance, 
the Court struck down aggregate limits on contributions as a violation of the 
First Amendment.90 In an opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts held 
that the aggregate limits “impose[d] a special burden on broader participation in 
the democratic process.”91 Although “broader participation” usually means 
participation by greater numbers of people, for the Court majority it meant more 
participation by a single wealthy individual—in this case, Mr. McCutcheon, who 
wished to donate $135,000 in the 2013–2014 election cycle.92 According to the 
majority, the First Amendment protects the participatory activity of 
“contributing to someone who will advocate for [the donor’s] policy 
preferences.”93 The Court set aside fears that such an exchange might amount to 
corruption.94 Indeed, the majority endorsed the idea that responsiveness to 
wealthy donors “embod[ied] a central feature of democracy—that constituents 
 
 85. Id. at 359–60. For a discussion of the Court’s approach to the First Amendment, see James 
A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied 
Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 679–80 (2011). 
 86. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
616 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 127–28, 130 
(2010). 
 87. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363-64. For a discussion of the implications, see Richard L. 
Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 
990–92 (2011); Mark C. Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
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 89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 322 (James Madison). 
 90. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014). 
 91. Id. at 204–05. 
 92. Id. at 194–95. 
 93. Id. at 204. 
 94. Id. at 192. 
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support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are 
elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.”95 For the Court, this 
responsiveness is “key to the very concept of self-governance through elected 
officials.”96 For the Framers, however, an exchange of this kind between 
wealthy donors and elected representatives would have fallen within their more 
capacious understanding of corruption, which broadly encompassed the use of 
public power to serve private ends.97  
2. The Role of the People 
The second continuity concerns the people. It is important to emphasize that 
there is not an exact equivalence between the founding era and the Court 
majority’s approach. Clearly, there are crucial differences, the most important 
one being slavery. In addition, voting during the framing era was not open to 
anyone who was not a propertied white male. Despite these important 
differences, there are conceptual continuities. While it is true that Madison saw 
elections as a key mechanism to keep the powerful accountable, much of the 
constitutional infrastructure was designed with a view to contain political 
participation.  
A similar trend of containing popular participation and restricting the 
franchise is evident in the Court’s recent election law decisions. As described 
above, the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions devalue popular 
participation by providing wealthy interests with an outsized voice.98 Congress 
has become increasingly dependent on a tiny minority of the population, namely 
funders and lobbyists, arguably to the detriment of the public good.99 The Court 
majority’s hostility to egalitarian principles was also on display in Arizona Free 
Enterprise v. Bennett, in which it struck down part of Arizona’s public financing 
scheme on the grounds that a matching funds provision, under which publicly 
financed candidates received additional funds if their privately financed 
opponents exceeded a set spending limit, violated the First Amendment rights 
of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups.100 
 
 95. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192. 
 96. Id. at 227. 
 97. Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 103, 111–12, 
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 98. Yasmin Dawood, Democracy Divided: Campaign Finance Regulation and the Right to 
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TO STOP IT 110 (1st ed. 2011); TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN 
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 100. Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011). See also Davis v. FEC, 
554 U.S. 724, 726, 729 (2008) (holding “Millionaire’s Amendment” in the Bipartisan Campaign 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
624 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:609 
Although there are no overt restrictions on voting today because of race or 
gender, there are barriers to voting, such as voter qualification rules that have a 
disproportionate impact on minority voters and low-income individuals.101 The 
conservative justices on the Supreme Court do not seem to be particularly 
concerned about these barriers to voting; after all, they effectively eliminated the 
preclearance procedure in Shelby County.102 The fallout from the decision was 
swift. In the wake of Shelby County, many states passed stringent voter 
qualification rules, which were justified as promoting electoral integrity but 
which were arguably designed to make voting harder, in particular for minority 
voters—what amounts to a new form of voter suppression.103 This development 
was aided by the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board, which held in a fractured opinion that Indiana’s voter identification law 
did not violate the Constitution.104 In a subsequent case, Arizona v. Inter Tribal 
Council, the Court majority constrained Congress’ power under the Elections 
Clause, finding that it “empowers Congress to regulate how elections are held, 
but not who may vote in them.”105 According to the majority, the states have 
jurisdiction over voter qualifications.106 While the Court in Inter Tribal Council 
did find that Arizona’s requirement of documentary proof of citizenship was 
invalid as it was pre-empted by the federal National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA), in a more recent decision, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 
however, the conservative justices upheld Ohio’s voter purge law of non-voters 
even though the NVRA prohibits states from striking voters off the rolls for 
failure to vote.107 
3. The Management of Elections  
The third continuity concerns the management of elections. As described by 
the Rucho majority, the Framers’ approach to the management of congressional 
elections is found in the Elections Clause,108 which provides the states with the 
power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for 
members of Congress, while giving Congress the power to “make or alter such 
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Regulations” at any time.109 During the debates at the Constitutional 
Convention, and subsequently during ratification, noted the majority, the 
Elections Clause was a subject of dispute.110 In response to Antifederalist fears 
of national power of elections, the Federalists argued that congressional 
authority over electoral rules was necessary in the event that state legislatures 
undermined fair representation.111 According to the Court majority, the Framers 
opted for a “characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, 
expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.”112 The majority 
declined, however, to go so far as to accept the appellants’ contention that 
“through the Elections Clause, the Framers set aside electoral issues such as the 
one before us as questions that only Congress can resolve.”113 It observed instead 
that “our cases have held that there is a role for the courts with respect to at least 
some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of congressional districts,”114 
noting in particular two such issues—one-person, one-vote and racial 
gerrymandering.115 The Rucho majority also emphasized the Framers’ 
familiarity with partisan gerrymandering during the ratification of the 
Constitution and in subsequent years.116 This analysis was used by the majority 
as one of the reasons why partisan gerrymandering lay beyond the purview of 
the federal judiciary. 
The difficulty with the majority’s analysis is that it downplays the 
importance of elections in the Framers’ constitutional vision. Although the 
Framers sought to cabin popular power and influence, they nonetheless believed 
that elections were an indispensable safeguard and the principal mechanism by 
which to throw out elected officials who were betraying the public trust. In 
Federalist No. 51, Madison stated that a “dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government.”117 To ensure liberty, it was essential 
that the legislature “have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate 
sympathy with, the people.”118 According to Madison, “[f]requent elections are 
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be 
effectually secured.”119 Frequent elections force representatives to exercise 
restraint in the use of their power in order to ensure reelection.120 Although the 
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people had a limited role in Madison’s constitutional vision it was still a crucial 
one: the people were the ultimate stopgap against the abuse of power by elected 
officials. As Justice Kagan observed, “[f]ree and fair and periodic elections are 
the key to that vision.”121 Contemporary partisan gerrymandering, however, 
seriously undermines the protective power of elections.122  
III.  ELECTION LAW AND THE COURT’S ORIGINALIST ORIENTATION 
The emerging elitist conception of democracy presents a significant 
challenge to the egalitarian conception of democracy that was evident in the 
Supreme Court’s election law decisions in the decades following the civil rights 
era. The elitist conception of democracy is relevant for another reason: it sheds 
light on the increasing significance of the founding era in the Court’s recent 
election law decisions. This Part suggests that while neither the Court’s 
decisions nor the elitist conception of democracy amount to an originalist 
approach to the Constitution, some of the Court majority’s arguments in the 
cases display an “originalist orientation.” The concept of an originalist 
orientation is meant to capture the idea that the original meaning takes a 
preponderant weight in the Court’s analysis and is consistent with the overall 
outcome even if it does not strictly speaking compel that outcome. This 
originalist orientation has significant implications for future election law cases 
because it means that, at least for some issues, the founding era is serving as an 
implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the Court. In future cases, this 
originalist orientation will likely reinforce the elitist conception of democracy, 
and by extension, further erode the egalitarian approach to democracy. 
While a detailed exposition of originalism is beyond the scope of this Essay, 
it is useful to provide a brief description. According to Lawrence Solum, 
originalism is best understood as a “family” of constitutional theories that share 
two key features: first, the Fixation Thesis, which means that “original meaning 
. . . is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified”; and second, the 
Constraint Principle, which refers to the idea that constitutional actors including 
judges “ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they engage in 
constitutional practice[s]” such as deciding cases.123 Many constitutional 
theorists think that the “original meaning” is determined by the original public 
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meaning, while others think it is determined by the original intention of the 
Framers or by the original methods of constitutional interpretation.124 While 
almost all constitutional theorists (including living constitutionalists) place some 
weight on original meaning,125 what distinguishes originalist interpreters is that 
they are bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text.126 
The elitist conception of democracy cannot be described as originalist 
despite its affinities with the Framers’ theories of representative government. 
Overarching conceptions of democratic self-government are not located in any 
one constitutional provision. Nor is it the case that the majority’s election law 
decisions either individually or collectively could be described as originalist. As 
for the justices on the Supreme Court, only Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch 
are described as committed originalists, although there is an argument to be 
made, as John McGinnis suggests, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
despite not identifying as originalists, have displayed a limited form of 
originalism in some of their decisions.127 
That being said, the Court majority has advanced certain arguments that 
have originalist elements. These originalist-style arguments appear to be more 
common in recent election law decisions than they have been in the decisions of 
decades past, at least with respect to the majority judgments. Consider, for 
example, the majority’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause. As described in 
Part II, the majority provided an analysis of the Elections Clause that 
emphasized its original meaning, namely that the Framers had assigned 
responsibility over districting to Congress and to the states.128 The majority also 
provided a detailed analysis of partisan gerrymandering at the time of the 
framing. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan observed that “[t]o its credit, 
the majority does not frame that point as an originalist constitutional 
argument.”129 Justice Kagan went on to say that the reason the Court did not use 
an originalist lens is that “racial and residential gerrymanders were also once 
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with us, but the Court has done something about that fact.”130 One possible 
interpretation, then, is that the Court majority’s analysis of the Elections Clause 
is not originalist; indeed, it is a rejection of originalism because the Court 
acknowledged two lines of precedents that show that the federal courts do have 
a role in districting. Another possibility is that while the majority did appear to 
rely on an originalist-type argument, the status of that argument in the Court’s 
analysis is ambiguous.131  
A related possibility is that the majority did not reject an originalist 
interpretation so much as execute a careful dodge around a set of existing 
precedents.132 After all, the Rucho majority was at considerable pains to 
emphasize that “[a]t no point was there a suggestion that the federal courts had 
a role to play [in districting]. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had 
ever heard of courts doing such a thing.”133 The majority also prefaced its brief 
description of the two exceptions (one-person, one-vote, and racial 
gerrymandering) with the observation that “[e]arly on, doubts were raised about 
the competence of the federal courts to resolve these questions.”134 The 
discussion of the malapportionment cases is brief and does not even mention 
Reynolds v. Sims.135 As for racial gerrymandering, the majority stated that laws 
that “explicitly discriminate on the basis of race . . . are of course presumptively 
invalid,” but the two cases cited are Gomillion v. Lightfoot and Shaw v. Reno.136 
Carving out an exception for one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering 
could be explained either as deference to existing precedent or as an 
acknowledgment that these two exceptions are covered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The majority’s analysis of the Elections Clause is originalist in its 
tone, and its refusal to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering is consistent with its 
interpretation of the text. That being said, the majority’s analysis does not appear 
to comport with the Constraint Principle, which, as described above, is a 
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necessary element of an originalist argument. While consistent with the final 
outcome, the majority’s reliance on original meaning did not compel the result 
since the majority advanced several arguments, including the analysis of 
precedents, that also arrived at the same conclusion. 
Even if the Court majority’s reliance on the text and history of the 
Constitution in its election law decisions is not originalist in a strict sense, some 
of the majority’s positions in the cases display an originalist orientation. By 
“originalist orientation,” I mean that the arguments about original meaning take 
a preponderant weight in the analysis and are consistent with the outcome even 
if they do not compel the overall outcome. William Baude draws a distinction 
between (1) exclusive originalism, which requires that judges only rely on 
original meaning; (2) inclusive originalism, which permits judges to also rely on 
precedent which has an “originalist pedigree”; and (3) pluralist accounts, which 
hold that there are multiple modalities of constitutional interpretation, including 
original meaning.137 An originalist orientation does not fit within Professor 
Baude’s account of exclusive originalism, nor does it necessarily fit within 
inclusive originalism. But an originalist orientation also seems to differ from 
pluralist accounts that hold that there is no clear hierarchy among the various 
modalities of constitutional interpretation.138 An originalist orientation 
privileges original meaning where it can but usually defers to non-originalist 
precedent when the disruption to settled law would be too great.139 In those 
instances, an originalist orientation would be less exacting than inclusive 
originalism but would place more presumptive weight on original meaning than 
a pluralist approach. Under an originalist orientation, original meaning is 
authoritative but not compulsory across the board. 
The originalist orientation means that, at least for some issues, the founding 
era is serving as an implicit baseline for the conservative wing of the Court. 
There are three reasons why this originalist orientation matters. First, under an 
originalist orientation, non-originalist precedents would likely carry less relative 
weight than they would for a living constitutionalist, who would also likely 
consult original meaning but would place greater emphasis on stare decisis. In 
Shelby County, for example, Chief Justice Roberts was willing to strike down a 
key protection provided by the Voting Rights Act on the basis of an argument 
that was at least partially based on an originalist interpretation of the Tenth 
Amendment.140 According to the majority, the preclearance process departed 
from basic principles of federalism including state autonomy over the regulation 
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 138. Id. at 2404. 
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of elections and the principle of equal sovereignty among the states, and for this 
reason it could not be justified on the basis of outdated conditions.141  
In Rucho, the majority acknowledged that despite its originalist-style 
interpretation of the Elections Clause, the Court does have a role to play in 
districting, at least with respect to one-person, one-vote and racial 
gerrymandering.142 One (ominous) possibility, however, is that the same logic 
does in fact apply to these two exceptions as well; that is, the Framers never 
contemplated that the federal courts would be engaged in overseeing districting 
to fix malapportionment and racial gerrymandering.143 This line of reasoning 
could be used at some future point to undercut the relevant precedents thereby 
constraining the judicial role with respect to districting. Although this is a remote 
possibility given the disruption to settled law, it is not entirely inconceivable 
particularly in view of Chief Justice Roberts’ incrementalist strategy of setting 
up arguments in one case in order to subsequently deploy them in future cases 
to overturn or constrain longstanding precedents. 
Second, an originalist orientation has a significant impact on election law 
federalism. While in practice the states are primarily responsible for devising 
electoral rules, the jurisdictional question as to how to draw a line between state 
authority over elections and federal authority over elections is complex and 
subject to continuing dispute.144 The debate is often couched in the language of 
state sovereignty versus national sovereignty, with theories tilting towards one 
or the other. State sovereignty in election law matters could be viewed as 
consistent with the “laboratories of democracy” tradition145 or with theories that 
view states as venues for minority empowerment.146 That being said, state 
sovereignty in election law matters has tended, for the most part and certainly as 
a historical matter, to lead to the adoption of rules that are either anti-democratic 
or that are consistent with an elitist approach to democracy. The era of Jim Crow 
and the resistance to the Voting Rights Act, not to mention slavery itself, are 
emblematic of the serious deleterious consequences of state sovereignty. States 
have also engaged in practices, such as malapportionment and the adoption of 
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restrictive voter qualification laws, that have served to undermine political 
equality, entrench power, and reduce democratic accountability. By contrast, the 
national government has been an important source of laws, such as the Voting 
Rights Act, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote 
Act, which promote democratic access and equality. 
While the Supreme Court in years past addressed and remedied 
malapportionment,147 removed restrictions on voting,148 prevented racial vote 
dilution,149 and upheld the Voting Rights Act,150 the current conservative wing 
of the Court has been far more deferential to state sovereignty in election-law 
matters, even when such deference is not warranted. Franita Tolson argues, for 
instance, that the framework of dual federalism is not appropriate for the 
Elections Clause because the Clause provides Congress with a broader scope of 
power than is recognized by the Court.151 Under the Elections Clause, the federal 
government holds ultimate power over federal elections even in the face of state 
sovereignty, subject to a qualified exception involving voter qualification 
rules.152 Rather than treating the federal government and states as sharing power 
over federal elections, states should be treated as subordinate to federal 
authority. Professor Tolson further urges that because the Elections Clause is an 
underenforced constitutional provision, the true scope of federal authority over 
elections is misunderstood.153 For this reason, even extensive federal legislation 
relying on the Elections Clause, such as the H.R. 1 bill overhauling the federal 
election system, should be treated as a valid exercise of federal authority rather 
than as an unconstitutional encroachment on state authority.154 
An originalist orientation to election law federalism often results in 
outcomes that are inconsistent with an egalitarian vision of democracy. As 
Professor Charles and Professor Fuentes-Rohwer argue, the states are “winning 
the federalism battle” and there is “scant evidence” that the states are interested 
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in protecting minority voting rights.155 The Court’s decision in Shelby County 
eviscerated the national oversight of discriminatory electoral practices by 
covered jurisdictions. The rationale was to protect the equal sovereignty of 
states. Professor Hasen argues that by broadening the scope of state autonomy 
under the Tenth Amendment, the Shelby majority ignored how the Fifteenth 
Amendment “changed the state-federal balance of power and the scope of the 
Tenth Amendment.”156 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg emphasized in her 
dissenting opinion that Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments should be treated with substantial deference by the 
Court.157 Not only does an originalist orientation discount longstanding 
precedents, it also privileges the first framing over the second framing, thereby 
further diluting the influence of the Reconstruction Amendments. In addition, it 
ultimately reinforces a general trend in which the conservative wing of the Court 
reserves election law matters to the states. The net outcome is likely to erode 
egalitarian democracy and encourage the implementation of an elitist vision of 
democracy or, at the very least, not stand in its way. 
Third, an originalist orientation could make reform efforts more difficult. 
Not only is the Court majority less inclined to view the judicial function through 
an Ely-inspired lens, it also takes an originalist and hence formalist view of the 
function of Congress and the state governments, treating these institutions as 
first responders to democratic malfunctions such as partisan gerrymandering 
notwithstanding current political realities of gridlock and partisan self-
entrenchment.158 An originalist orientation could also thwart reform efforts that 
are viewed as incompatible with the constitutional text. In Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,159 a majority of 
the Court upheld an Arizona ballot measure that established an independent 
redistricting commission. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the dissenting opinion, 
arguing that the word “Legislature” in the Elections Clause referred to a 
representative body, and not the people at large, and hence, the congressional 
redistricting authority of the state legislature could not be transferred by ballot 
initiative to an independent redistricting commission.160 In Rucho, however, 
Chief Justice Roberts listed independent redistricting commissions as one of the 
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ways in which the states are addressing partisan gerrymandering,161 even 
though, as Justice Kagan pointed out, this solution was inconsistent with his 
earlier dissent in Arizona State Legislature.162 To the extent that future reform 
efforts may rely on provisions in the U.S. Constitution, the Court majority’s 
originalist orientation could stymie these efforts particularly given the new 
configuration of the Court’s conservative majority.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has argued that the Supreme Court’s recent election law 
decisions can be understood as instantiating a conception of democracy that is 
distinctly elitist in its nature. This elitist conception of democracy is gradually 
displacing the egalitarian vision of democracy that was ushered in by the 
Supreme Court during the civil rights era. In recent years the Court majority has 
refused to check the undemocratic impulses emanating from the states and 
indeed has tacitly allowed such impulses in keeping with the emerging elitist 
model of democracy. Future election law decisions will no doubt involve a 
similar clash between an elitist approach to democracy, as espoused by the 
Court’s conservative wing, and an egalitarian approach to democracy, as 
defended by the liberal wing.  
The Court’s emerging elitist vision of democracy has significant continuities 
with the founding era. Even if not originalist in the strict sense, the Court 
majority’s orientation to the framing era has significant implications for the 
future of election law. All three of the trends that result from its originalist 
orientation—discounting non-originalist precedents, favoring the states over the 
national government when deciding jurisdictional questions, and making reform 
efforts more difficult—also have the consequence of reinforcing elitist 
democracy and eroding egalitarian democracy. If 1789 is the Court majority’s 
implicit baseline, many phenomena that are problematic from an egalitarian 
democratic perspective will not seem particularly troubling. The Court’s 
originalist orientation is also selective; for instance, it gives insufficient weight 
to the Reconstruction Amendments, which can be understood in egalitarian 
terms, and which are part of the constitutional text after all, but which are playing 
an increasingly constrained role in the majority’s decisions. In sum, the Court 
majority’s orientation to the founding era poses a direct threat to all the gains 
that have been achieved over the last several decades which have rendered 
democratic self-government more inclusive, more equal, and more responsive 
to the people.
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